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variable. We find that markets give more importance to profitability of a bank than its size when 
pricing the riskiness of the bank. We conclude that Too Big to Fail is not a valid term as thought 
but may be Too Profitable to Fail may be better. 
 
Keywords: Banking, Too Big to Fail, CDS Market 
JEL Classifications: G21, G28 
 
İlker Arslan  
Department of Economics 







1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................  4 
2 Literature Review ..........................................................................................................................  5 
3 Methodology .................................................................................................................................  6 
4 Data and Results ............................................................................................................................  8 
4. a. Default Probability Trends....................................................................................................  9 
4. b. Regression Results  ..............................................................................................................  13 
5 Conclusion  ...................................................................................................................................  16 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................  17 






“Too Big to Fail” is a well known phenomenon which is widely used even by people who are not 
well-informed in economics and banking. On the other hand the subject is a matter of debate 
among academicians. Is it really true that a bank that is huge  in size must be rescued from 
bankruptcy? Is it good for the economy as a whole? What is the criterion that makes a bank too 
big to fail? Do markets really care about this phenomenon in pricing the banks? Why policy 
makers rely on Too Big to Fail policies so much? Although many people investigate about the 
subject there are still many questions waiting to be answered? 
Bailout of a large bank by a government as seen frequently in the large financial turmoil of 2008 
is called as “Too Big to Fail (TBTF)” policy. People who support TBTF policies say that, by 
rescuing large banks from bankruptcy, impacts  of the failure on other institutions or on real 
economy is eliminated. On the other hand, people who oppose TBTF policies argue that, these 
policies seem attractive in the short run in spite of the large financial costs to governments; but in 
the long run the costs are even larger.  
Shull (2010), takes the history of TBTF back to the 10th century Abbasid Caliphate and mentions 
about Jewish Bankers that are protected by the state, or about Bank of England that„s rescued 
from a run in 1696, in his comprehensive and illuminating study. So we can say that the subject is 
not new and can be an interesting area for economic historians but the history of TBTF is out of 
this papers scope.  
The phenomenon of “Too Big to Fail” has been one of the most important issues of discussion 
for the last 25-30 years. The 1960s and 1970s were a transition period in banking from a highly 
regulated system established in 1930s to a relatively deregulated system. In the course of the 
transition,  bank  failures  increased  (Shull,  2010).Although  it  is  known  that  in  1931  German 
government rescued four large banks, which were having difficulties, from bankruptcy; the time 
when TBTF discussions increased was in 1984, when seventh largest bank of USA, Continental 
Illinois, came near bankruptcy and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), gave 100% 
guarantee for the deposits and bonds of the bank. At the beginning, after the case of Continental 
Illinois, it was accepted that the largest ten banks would not be allowed for bankruptcy. Later on 
the number increased to eleven. However, the number of banks that were included in TBTF 
policy increased implicitly in following years. The issue of TBTF was regulated with Federal 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FICIA) (1991), and National Depositor Preference Law 
(1993) in USA.  5 
 
As  one  might  expect,  research  about  TBTF  is  abundant.  Especially  with  the  recent  global 
economic crisis, the issue became hot again. Debate over the TBTF policies mounted. In March 
2010,  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Ben  Bernanke  claimed  TBTF  was  a  pernicious  problem. 
Bernanke also added, regulators had to be significantly tougher on large and complex financial 
firms to limit wider risks. He said TBTF to be among the most insidious problems that make 
barriers to competition in financial markets.  
It  is  a  matter  of  discussion  why  governments  need  TBTF  policies  or  generally  why  TBTF 
phenomenon is needed in a so-called free market world. In our study we will investigate whether 
markets really value TBTF while pricing riskiness of banks. 
2 Literature Review 
 
One of the studies that support TBTF, is Todd & Thomson‟s (1990) which argues that, high 
levels  of  interbank  exposure  reduce  safety  and  soundness  of  the  banking  system;  interbank 
exposure  affects  the  ability  of  the  FDIC  and  bank  regulators  to  use  market  discipline  as  a 
constraint on banks‟ risk taking, and a rising level of interbank exposure is indicative of reduced 
stability of the financial system. 
On the other hand, Ohara & Shaw (1990) argue that TBTF policies create inequalities among 
banks.  According  to  them  the  selective  policy  of  charging  the  same  insurance  premium  to 
institutions but providing some with greater coverage, imposes unnecessary costs on the market. 
They also conclude setting and telling the policy to the market in an understandable way is very 
important to get the intended result.  
Some authors like Soussa (2000), Rime (2005), and Hughes & Mester (1993) claim that banks 
that are TBTF get favorable ratings and credit spreads. Some other authors on the other hand, 
argue that TBTF policies allow large banks grow more more than optimal. Kane (2000) and 
Penas & Unal (2004) are among those authors. Similarly, Boyd & Gertler (1993) argues that 
TBTF policies encourage banks to take excessive risks. On the other hand some other authors do 
not accept this argument. For example, Demsetz & Strahan (1997) and Soussa (2000) argue large 
banks do not have excessive risks. 
As  told  before  discussions  about  TBTF  increased  very  much  after  the  latest  financial  and 
economic crisis. But, actually before that, Stern and Feldman (2004) claimed that TBTF problem 
had increased. However, later on Mishkin (2006) refused this idea and claimed TBTF problem 
had been reduced with the help of FDICIA. 6 
 
In latest years empirical studies about TBTF have increased. Brewer and Jagtiani (2009) try to 
estimate the value of being TBTF. Using data from the merger boom of 1991-2004, they find that 
organizations are willing to pay an added premium to reach an asset size of TBTF. According to 
their estimations the added premiums for the eight mergers which increased the asset size of 
organizations over $100 million was $14 million. 
Zhou (2009) examines relationship between three measures on systematic importance and size 
for the bank. He concludes that TBTF argument is not always valid, and alternative measures on 
systematic importance should be considered.  
Shull (2010) argues that, it is risky to have a relatively few large banking institutions in which a 
large proportion of financial resources are concentrated. In that case, Shull says, each bank, by 
virtue  of  its  absolute  and  relative  size,  would  be  system  threatening  in  failure,  each  would 
unavoidably exercise powerful influence over regulatory authorities, and each would likely be 
viewed as an irreplaceable national resource. Shull claims that limiting further growth through 
restrictions on specific activities, revisions of bank merger policy, and possibly divestiture to 
reduce concentration can reduce the TBTF problems. 
Goodlet (2010) is also one of the people who argue that long run costs of TBTF policies are 
much greater than short run benefits. Goodlet also claims that the reason of Lehman‟s bankruptcy 
in 2008 was that, no one was expecting such a thing after the bailout of Bear Sterns. He adds that 
the important thing is not rescuing or letting a bank fail but managing the expectations about 
failures in a consistent and coordinated manner.   
3 Methodology 
 
In our study we will focus on the question whether markets price “too big to fail” phenomenon? 
Or put in other words, do markets care about size of a bank while pricing it? We will use CDS 
data of international banks and compute their default probabilities with the help of this data. Then 
we will regress default probabilities of banks with their financial values like total assets, total 
shareholders‟ equity, net income and ROA.  
To  compute  the  default  probabilities  of  banks,  we  will  apply  the  methodology  of  Ranciere 
(2001).  In  this  study  Ranciere  used  CDS  spreads  of  Argentina  and  Brazil  to  obtain  default 
probabilities of these countries.  In our study we will use the same methodology to  compute 
default probabilities of the banks analyzed. 
 7 
 
The variables that will be used in the study are: 
DSt,t‟  :  Default spread between t and t‟ 
Rt,t‟  :  Risk free rate between t and t‟ 
Pst  :  Default probability between t and t+6 months conditional on no default before t 
Pt  :  Default probability between t and t+1 conditional on no default before t 
St  :  Survival probability of an obligation at time t 
Dt  :  Cumulative default probability of an obligation at time t 
Ht  :  Probability of a default between t and t+1 
R  :  The recovery rate 
 
With indicative levels for annualized default spread with a maturity of 1 , 2 and 3 years, the no 
arbitrage condition may be applied iteratively to extract one year forward default spreads in years 









Having extracted the forward default term structure, we can simply treat each interval of one year 
independently. The forward spread then reflects  the  conditional risk of default for the  given 
period. Recalling that the default premium paid every 6  months  covers the expected cost of 
default for the given 6-month period, we apply the risk neutral valuation principal to obtain the 
conditional 6-month default probability Pst: 8 
 
 
Knowing that no default over one year is equivalent to no default in any of the two 6-months 
period, we obtained the annualized probability of default as Pt = 1 – (1 – Pst)
2. 
Having derived for each yearly period the conditional default probability, we can then simply 
compute: 
The survival probability  :  St = (1-P0)(1-P1)...(1-Pt) 
The cumulative default probability  :  Dt = 1 - St 
The probability of a default between t and t+1  :  (1-P0)(1-P1)...(1-Pt-1)Pt 
 
After obtaining default probabilities for banks we will analyze whether  there is consistency 
between bank size and default probability.   To do this we have obtained  total assets, total 
shareholders‟ equity, and net income data. Banks publish their financial tables quarterly so our 
regression panel data is also quarterly. We will regress these values with the default probabilities 
by ordinary least squares method and investigate whether there is a relationship between default 
probability of a bank estimated by using CDS data and size of it. 
To extend our study we have done the regression and used Return on Assets (ROA) which is 
calculated as “Net Income/Total Assets” as dependent variable. In this way we will investigate 
whether profitability is related with banks‟ default probability. 
4 Data and Results 
 
We  have  used  CDS  data  of  22  banks  from  different  countries  for  the  period  14.08.2008  – 
12.09.2010. The list of banks is given below. And for risk free rate we have used two sets of data. 
For the banks that have USD denominated CDS, we have used US Treasury Bond rates as risk 
free rate and German Treasury Bonds for the banks that have EUR denominated CDS. 
 
Banco Bilbao VizcayaArgentaria SA (BBVA) 
Banco Santander SA 
Barclays Bank PLC 
BNP Paribas 
Commerzbank AG 
Credit Agricole SA 9 
 
Credit Suisse Group AG 
Deutsche Bank AG 
HSBC Bank PLC 
ING Bank NV 
Lloyds TSB Bank PLC 




American Express Co 
Bank of America Corp 
Citigroup Inc 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 
Morgan Stanley 
Wells Fargo & Co 
 
4. a. Default Probability Trends 
 
In the first part of our study we have analyzed default rate trends especially to see whether they 
are realistic. Her we give the default rate trends for zero recovery rates. To keep graphs as clear 
as possible, we separate US and European banks. In the tables it is obviously seen that calculated 
default  probabilities  of  banks  move  in  a  realistic  manner.  Default  rates  of  American  Banks 
increase suddenly after collapse of Lehman brothers in 15.09.2008. Default rates of US banks 
relatively  converge  in  time.  The  periods  when  default  probabilities  of  for  instance  Morgan 
Stanley and Citi Group reach a top, overlap with the periods that bad news and rumors about 
those banks were frequent. Similar observation can be done in European banks too. For example 
default rates of BBVA and Santander increases very much in 2010 when concerns about Spanish 
economy increase. 
We can also see that default rates of US banks converge in time but European banks show less 
homogeneity  and  less  convergent  trends.  This  is  because  unlike  US  banks  they  belong  to 
different countries and reflect economic conditions of their home countries.  10 
 
 
Figure 1 : 1 Year Default Probability Trends for European Banks 
 
 





















































Figure 3 : 2 Year Default Probability Trends for European Banks 
 
 






































Figure 5 : 3 Year Default Probability Trends for European Banks 
 
 
Figure 6 : 3 Year Default Probability Trends for US Banks 




































4. b. Regression Results 
 
In the second part of our analysis we will regress the default rates calculated in the previous 
section and regress them with financial data that reflects size. The financial data included is total 
assets, total shareholders‟ equity and net income. American Express is not included in this part as 
we could not reach financial data of that bank.  
As a correlation value of 0,41 is calculated between the data of total assets and total shareholders‟ 
equity and correlation of 0,16 between total shareholders‟ equity and net income we did not place 
total shareholders‟ equity data with the other two in the same regression. Correlation between 
total assets and net income is 0,08. 
Our regression results are given in the table below. The detailed results are given in the appendix. 
In the tables dependent variables are coded this way: Dt is cumulative default probability of an 
obligation  at  time  t,  the  last  two  digits  symbolize  recovery  rate.  i.e.  D100  means  default 
probability in 1 year with zero recovery rates. And, independent variables are: 
ASSET: Total Assets,  
EQ: Total Shareholders‟ Equity, 
NI: Net Income. 
All three financial values are in billion USD. 
Dependent Variable  Variable  Coefficient  Significance 
D100 
C  1,575413  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000192  0,1954 
D100  C  1,122335  0,0000 
EQ  0,001636  0,4178 
D100  C  1,342073  0,0000 
NI  -0,021660  0,0812 
D200  C  3,292400  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000424  0,1019 
D200  C  2,264415  0,0000 
EQ  0,002633  0,4576 
D200  C  2,735958  0,0000 
NI  -0,039645  0,0656 
D300  C  4,568599  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000413  0,2321 
D300  C  3,547881  0,0000 14 
 
Dependent Variable  Variable  Coefficient  Significance 
EQ  0,004042  0,3923 
D300  C  4,067905  0,0000 
NI  -0,048805  0,0894 
D125  C  2,075871  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000250  0,1962 
D125  C  1,482581  0,0000 
EQ  0,002181  0,4068 
D125  C  1,774194  0,0000 
NI  -0,028554  0,0775 
D225  C  4,315060  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000545  0,1032 
D225  C  3,112228  0,0000 
EQ  0,003500  0,4445 
D225  C  3,602756  0,0000 
NI  -0,051887  0,0620 
D325  C  5,961653  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000521  0,2363 
D325 
C  4,652558  0,0000 
EQ  0,005380  0,3707 
D325 
C  5,338843  0,0000 
NI  -0,063559  0,0820 
 
In the table it is seen that there default probability does not have a significant relationship with 
either  total  assets  or  total  shareholders‟  equity.  But  there  is  a  negative  relationship  between 
default probability and net income with 10% significance level.  
In the second part of our study we regress default probability with total assets and net income 
together.  
Dependent Variable  Variable  Coefficient  Significance 
D100 
C  1,632140  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000174  0,2380 
NI  -0,020616  0,0973 
D200 
C  3,392234  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000391  0,1290 
NI  -0,037265  0,0830 
D300 
C  4,693274  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000373  0,2806 
NI  -0,046537  0,1059 
D125  C  2,150711  0,0000 15 
 
Dependent Variable  Variable  Coefficient  Significance 
ASSET  -0,000226  0,2395 
NI  -0,027198  0,0930 
D225 
C  4,445875  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000502  0,1319 
NI  -0,048829  0,0786 
D325 
C  6,124300  0,0000 
ASSET  -0,000468  0,2865 
NI  -0,060710  0,0973 
 
In this part we can again claim that there is a significant relationship between default probability 
and  net  income  but  we  cannot  say  the  same  for  total  assets.  Only  in  the  case  of  D300  the 
significance is slightly bigger than 10% but that can be disregarded. 
Next, we calculate ROA (Return on Assets) values which is equal to “Net Income/Total Assets”: 
Dependent Variable  Variable  Coefficient  Significance 
D100  C  1,345134  0,0000 
ROA  -0,350940  0,1188 
D200 
C  2,739632  0,0000 
ROA  -0,645542  0,1008 
D300  C  4,066324  0,0000 
ROA  -0,0771425  0,1416 
D125  C  1,778625  0,0000 
ROA  -0,464116  0,1132 
D225  C  3,608244  0,0000 
ROA  -0,847473  0,0952 
D325  C  5,338591  0,0000 
ROA  -1,011528  0,1297 
 
Although in this part significance levels are slightly more than 10% except in the case of D225 







In our study we have tried to find an answer to the question whether there is a relationship 
between  banks‟  size  and  the  risk,  markets  attribute  to  them.  We  have  calculated  default 
probabilities of banks with the help of CDS market data which are determined by markets. In this 
part we have concluded that default probabilities reflect market in a realistic manner.  
Proceeding to the second part of our analysis, we have regressed default probabilities of banks in 
one, two, and three years with financial data that reflect size of the banks. We have considered 
both zero and 25% recovery rates to see whether there is a difference.  
We have chosen three financial values which are total assets, total shareholders‟ equity and net 
income. In the first part we have regressed the financial values one by one. In the second part we 
have regressed total assets and net income together. We did not include total shareholders‟ equity 
as it had high correlation with the other variables.  
As a result we could not reach a conclusion that tells us there is a significant relationship between 
the size of a bank and default probability of it. On the other hand we have reached an interesting 
and important result. Although it seems there is not a significant relationship between the default 
probability and size, there seems to be a significant relationship between default probability and 
profitability of a bank.  
As a conclusion we can say that markets do not take into account how big a bank is but how 
profitable it is. So we propose the new concept of „Too Profitable to Fail” instead of TBTF. 17 
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Results for Zero Recovery Rates: 
 
Dependent Variable: D100     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  1.575413  0.268587  5.865565  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000192  0.000148  -1.299614  0.1954 
         
          R-squared  0.009145      Mean dependent var  1.251428 
Adjusted R-squared  0.003731      S.D. dependent var  1.362141 
S.E. of regression  1.359597      Akaike info criterion  3.463006 
Sum squared resid  338.2765      Schwarz criterion  3.497821 
Log likelihood  -318.3281      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.477116 
F-statistic  1.688996      Durbin-Watson stat  0.648066 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.195368       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D100     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  1.122335  0.187940  5.971769  0.0000 
EQ  0.001636  0.002015  0.812028  0.4178 
         
          R-squared  0.003590      Mean dependent var  1.251428 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.001855      S.D. dependent var  1.362141 
S.E. of regression  1.363403      Akaike info criterion  3.468597 
Sum squared resid  340.1729      Schwarz criterion  3.503411 
Log likelihood  -318.8452      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.482706 
F-statistic  0.659390      Durbin-Watson stat  0.641331 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.417831       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D100     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  1.342073  0.112206  11.96083  0.0000 
NI  -0.021660  0.012353  -1.753377  0.0812 
         
          R-squared  0.016522      Mean dependent var  1.251428 
Adjusted R-squared  0.011148      S.D. dependent var  1.362141 
S.E. of regression  1.354527      Akaike info criterion  3.455533 
Sum squared resid  335.7580      Schwarz criterion  3.490348 
Log likelihood  -317.6368      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.469643 
F-statistic  3.074331      Durbin-Watson stat  0.678589 20 
 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.081212       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D200     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  3.292400  0.472997  6.960723  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000424  0.000258  -1.644155  0.1019 
         
          R-squared  0.015127      Mean dependent var  2.570326 
Adjusted R-squared  0.009531      S.D. dependent var  2.354608 
S.E. of regression  2.343360      Akaike info criterion  4.552221 
Sum squared resid  966.4748      Schwarz criterion  4.587971 
Log likelihood  -403.1476      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.566718 
F-statistic  2.703245      Durbin-Watson stat  0.623769 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.101929       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D200     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  2.364415  0.328214  7.203885  0.0000 
EQ  0.002633  0.003537  0.744479  0.4576 
         
          R-squared  0.003139      Mean dependent var  2.570326 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.002525      S.D. dependent var  2.354608 
S.E. of regression  2.357578      Akaike info criterion  4.564319 
Sum squared resid  978.2387      Schwarz criterion  4.600069 
Log likelihood  -404.2244      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.578817 
F-statistic  0.554250      Durbin-Watson stat  0.612194 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.457579       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D200     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  2.735958  0.196765  13.90470  0.0000 
NI  -0.039645  0.021397  -1.852785  0.0656 
         
          R-squared  0.019131      Mean dependent var  2.570326 
Adjusted R-squared  0.013558      S.D. dependent var  2.354608 
S.E. of regression  2.338591      Akaike info criterion  4.548146 
Sum squared resid  962.5452      Schwarz criterion  4.583897 
Log likelihood  -402.7850      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.562644 
F-statistic  3.432812      Durbin-Watson stat  0.658116 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.065588       
         





Dependent Variable: D300     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  4.568599  0.632917  7.218325  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000413  0.000345  -1.198983  0.2321 
         
          R-squared  0.008102      Mean dependent var  3.864003 
Adjusted R-squared  0.002466      S.D. dependent var  3.139522 
S.E. of regression  3.135648      Akaike info criterion  5.134721 
Sum squared resid  1730.483      Schwarz criterion  5.170472 
Log likelihood  -454.9902      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.149219 
F-statistic  1.437560      Durbin-Watson stat  0.670172 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.232146       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D300     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  3.547881  0.437400  8.111292  0.0000 
EQ  0.004042  0.004713  0.857641  0.3923 
         
          R-squared  0.004162      Mean dependent var  3.864003 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.001496      S.D. dependent var  3.139522 
S.E. of regression  3.141870      Akaike info criterion  5.138686 
Sum squared resid  1737.357      Schwarz criterion  5.174436 
Log likelihood  -455.3430      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.153183 
F-statistic  0.735547      Durbin-Watson stat  0.664447 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.392257       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D300     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  4.067905  0.262734  15.48296  0.0000 
NI  -0.048805  0.028571  -1.708175  0.0894 
         
          R-squared  0.016308      Mean dependent var  3.864003 
Adjusted R-squared  0.010719      S.D. dependent var  3.139522 
S.E. of regression  3.122650      Akaike info criterion  5.126413 
Sum squared resid  1716.166      Schwarz criterion  5.162164 
Log likelihood  -454.2508      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.140911 
F-statistic  2.917861      Durbin-Watson stat  0.707550 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.089367       
         








Dependent Variable: D100     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  1.632140  0.269451  6.057280  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000174  0.000147  -1.183787  0.2380 
NI  -0.020616  0.012371  -1.666442  0.0973 
         
          R-squared  0.024037      Mean dependent var  1.251428 
Adjusted R-squared  0.013312      S.D. dependent var  1.362141 
S.E. of regression  1.353044      Akaike info criterion  3.458674 
Sum squared resid  333.1925      Schwarz criterion  3.510896 
Log likelihood  -316.9274      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.479838 
F-statistic  2.241213      Durbin-Watson stat  0.685523 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.109256       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D200     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  3.392234  0.473754  7.160331  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000391  0.000257  -1.521648  0.1299 
NI  -0.037265  0.021375  -1.743363  0.0830 
         
          R-squared  0.031940      Mean dependent var  2.570326 
Adjusted R-squared  0.020876      S.D. dependent var  2.354608 
S.E. of regression  2.329900      Akaike info criterion  4.546238 
Sum squared resid  949.9761      Schwarz criterion  4.599864 
Log likelihood  -401.6152      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.567985 
F-statistic  2.886941      Durbin-Watson stat  0.667793 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.058406       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D300     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  4.693274  0.634639  7.395181  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000373  0.000344  -1.082405  0.2806 
NI  -0.046537  0.028634  -1.625220  0.1059 
         
          R-squared  0.022850      Mean dependent var  3.864003 
Adjusted R-squared  0.011683      S.D. dependent var  3.139522 
S.E. of regression  3.121129      Akaike info criterion  5.130977 
Sum squared resid  1704.753      Schwarz criterion  5.184602 
Log likelihood  -453.6569      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.152723 
F-statistic  2.046153      Durbin-Watson stat  0.713799 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.132312       
         





Dependent Variable: D100     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  1.345134  0.116300  11.56609  0.0000 
ROA  -0.350940  0.223928  -1.567204  0.1188 
         
          R-squared  0.013244      Mean dependent var  1.251428 
Adjusted R-squared  0.007852      S.D. dependent var  1.362141 
S.E. of regression  1.356783      Akaike info criterion  3.458861 
Sum squared resid  336.8772      Schwarz criterion  3.493676 
Log likelihood  -317.9447      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.472971 
F-statistic  2.456129      Durbin-Watson stat  0.664977 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.118794       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D200     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  2.739632  0.203417  13.46803  0.0000 
ROA  -0.645542  0.391292  -1.649770  0.1008 
         
          R-squared  0.015229      Mean dependent var  2.570326 
Adjusted R-squared  0.009634      S.D. dependent var  2.354608 
S.E. of regression  2.343238      Akaike info criterion  4.552117 
Sum squared resid  966.3748      Schwarz criterion  4.587868 
Log likelihood  -403.1384      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.566615 
F-statistic  2.721742      Durbin-Watson stat  0.642406 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.100774       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D300     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  4.066324  0.271639  14.96957  0.0000 
ROA  -0.771425  0.522523  -1.476346  0.1416 
         
          R-squared  0.012233      Mean dependent var  3.864003 
Adjusted R-squared  0.006620      S.D. dependent var  3.139522 
S.E. of regression  3.129112      Akaike info criterion  5.130548 
Sum squared resid  1723.276      Schwarz criterion  5.166298 
Log likelihood  -454.6188      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.145046 
F-statistic  2.179599      Durbin-Watson stat  0.691610 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.141638       
         




Results for 25% Recovery Rates: 
Dependent Variable: D125     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  2.075871  0.349795  5.934541  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000250  0.000192  -1.297239  0.1962 
         
          R-squared  0.009112      Mean dependent var  1.654700 
Adjusted R-squared  0.003697      S.D. dependent var  1.773958 
S.E. of regression  1.770676      Akaike info criterion  3.991351 
Sum squared resid  573.7585      Schwarz criterion  4.026166 
Log likelihood  -367.2000      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.005461 
F-statistic  1.682828      Durbin-Watson stat  0.646404 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.196182       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D125     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  1.482581  0.244739  6.057802  0.0000 
EQ  0.002181  0.002623  0.831406  0.4068 
         
          R-squared  0.003763      Mean dependent var  1.654700 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.001681      S.D. dependent var  1.773958 
S.E. of regression  1.775448      Akaike info criterion  3.996735 
Sum squared resid  576.8557      Schwarz criterion  4.031550 
Log likelihood  -367.6980      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.010845 
F-statistic  0.691236      Durbin-Watson stat  0.639891 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.406828       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D125     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  1.774194  0.146099  12.14381  0.0000 
NI  -0.028554  0.016085  -1.775214  0.0775 
         
          R-squared  0.016929      Mean dependent var  1.654700 
Adjusted R-squared  0.011557      S.D. dependent var  1.773958 
S.E. of regression  1.763677      Akaike info criterion  3.983431 
Sum squared resid  569.2321      Schwarz criterion  4.018246 
Log likelihood  -366.4674      Hannan-Quinn criter.  3.997541 
F-statistic  3.151385      Durbin-Watson stat  0.677643 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.077525       
         






Dependent Variable: D225     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  4.315060  0.610931  7.063092  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000545  0.000333  -1.637877  0.1032 
         
          R-squared  0.015013      Mean dependent var  3.385978 
Adjusted R-squared  0.009417      S.D. dependent var  3.041075 
S.E. of regression  3.026723      Akaike info criterion  5.064010 
Sum squared resid  1612.345      Schwarz criterion  5.099761 
Log likelihood  -448.6969      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.078508 
F-statistic  2.682642      Durbin-Watson stat  0.621951 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.103234       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D225     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  3.112228  0.423862  7.342543  0.0000 
EQ  0.003500  0.004567  0.766407  0.4445 
         
          R-squared  0.003326      Mean dependent var  3.385978 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.002337      S.D. dependent var  3.041075 
S.E. of regression  3.044626      Akaike info criterion  5.075806 
Sum squared resid  1631.476      Schwarz criterion  5.111556 
Log likelihood  -449.7467      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.090303 
F-statistic  0.587380      Durbin-Watson stat  0.610691 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.444461       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D225     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  3.602756  0.254064  14.18052  0.0000 
NI  -0.051887  0.027628  -1.878020  0.0620 
         
          R-squared  0.019646      Mean dependent var  3.385978 
Adjusted R-squared  0.014076      S.D. dependent var  3.041075 
S.E. of regression  3.019597      Akaike info criterion  5.059296 
Sum squared resid  1604.762      Schwarz criterion  5.095047 
Log likelihood  -448.2774      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.073794 
F-statistic  3.526960      Durbin-Watson stat  0.657277 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.062032       
         








Dependent Variable: D325     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  5.961653  0.805208  7.403865  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000521  0.000439  -1.188222  0.2363 
         
          R-squared  0.007958      Mean dependent var  5.073298 
Adjusted R-squared  0.002322      S.D. dependent var  3.993867 
S.E. of regression  3.989228      Akaike info criterion  5.616245 
Sum squared resid  2800.854      Schwarz criterion  5.651995 
Log likelihood  -497.8458      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.630743 
F-statistic  1.411871      Durbin-Watson stat  0.664822 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.236347       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D325     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  4.652558  0.556318  8.363124  0.0000 
EQ  0.005380  0.005995  0.897472  0.3707 
         
          R-squared  0.004556      Mean dependent var  5.073298 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.001100      S.D. dependent var  3.993867 
S.E. of regression  3.996064      Akaike info criterion  5.619669 
Sum squared resid  2810.460      Schwarz criterion  5.655419 
Log likelihood  -498.1505      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.634167 
F-statistic  0.805456      Durbin-Watson stat  0.659651 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.370693       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D325     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  5.338843  0.334098  15.97986  0.0000 
NI  -0.063559  0.036332  -1.749408  0.0820 
         
          R-squared  0.017092      Mean dependent var  5.073298 
Adjusted R-squared  0.011507      S.D. dependent var  3.993867 
S.E. of regression  3.970822      Akaike info criterion  5.606996 
Sum squared resid  2775.067      Schwarz criterion  5.642746 
Log likelihood  -497.0226      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.621493 
F-statistic  3.060427      Durbin-Watson stat  0.704020 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.081964       
         






     27 
 
Dependent Variable: D125 
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  2.150711  0.350850  6.130000  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000226  0.000192  -1.180096  0.2395 
NI  -0.027198  0.016108  -1.688468  0.0930 
         
          R-squared  0.024394      Mean dependent var  1.654700 
Adjusted R-squared  0.013673      S.D. dependent var  1.773958 
S.E. of regression  1.761788      Akaike info criterion  3.986619 
Sum squared resid  564.9095      Schwarz criterion  4.038841 
Log likelihood  -365.7623      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.007784 
F-statistic  2.275386      Durbin-Watson stat  0.684461 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.105673       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D225     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  4.445875  0.611753  7.267431  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000502  0.000332  -1.513887  0.1319 
NI  -0.048829  0.027601  -1.769067  0.0786 
         
          R-squared  0.032319      Mean dependent var  3.385978 
Adjusted R-squared  0.021260      S.D. dependent var  3.041075 
S.E. of regression  3.008576      Akaike info criterion  5.057521 
Sum squared resid  1584.017      Schwarz criterion  5.111146 
Log likelihood  -447.1194      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.079267 
F-statistic  2.922351      Durbin-Watson stat  0.666743 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.056438       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D325     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  6.124300  0.807086  7.588164  0.0000 
ASSET  -0.000468  0.000438  -1.069014  0.2865 
NI  -0.060710  0.036415  -1.667199  0.0973 
         
          R-squared  0.023469      Mean dependent var  5.073298 
Adjusted R-squared  0.012308      S.D. dependent var  3.993867 
S.E. of regression  3.969212      Akaike info criterion  5.611723 
Sum squared resid  2757.063      Schwarz criterion  5.665348 
Log likelihood  -496.4433      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.633469 
F-statistic  2.102850      Durbin-Watson stat  0.709964 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.125183       
         





Dependent Variable: D125     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  1.778625  0.151429  11.74559  0.0000 
ROA  -0.464116  0.291567  -1.591800  0.1132 
         
          R-squared  0.013657      Mean dependent var  1.654700 
Adjusted R-squared  0.008267      S.D. dependent var  1.773958 
S.E. of regression  1.766610      Akaike info criterion  3.986754 
Sum squared resid  571.1268      Schwarz criterion  4.021569 
Log likelihood  -366.7748      Hannan-Quinn criter.  4.000864 
F-statistic  2.533827      Durbin-Watson stat  0.663889 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.113156       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D225     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  3.608244  0.262655  13.73760  0.0000 
ROA  -0.847473  0.505240  -1.677366  0.0952 
         
          R-squared  0.015735      Mean dependent var  3.385978 
Adjusted R-squared  0.010142      S.D. dependent var  3.041075 
S.E. of regression  3.025615      Akaike info criterion  5.063278 
Sum squared resid  1611.164      Schwarz criterion  5.099028 
Log likelihood  -448.6317      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.077776 
F-statistic  2.813557      Durbin-Watson stat  0.641395 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.095246       
         
           
Dependent Variable: D325     
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  5.338591  0.345426  15.45510  0.0000 
ROA  -1.011528  0.664458  -1.522336  0.1297 
         
          R-squared  0.012997      Mean dependent var  5.073298 
Adjusted R-squared  0.007389      S.D. dependent var  3.993867 
S.E. of regression  3.979085      Akaike info criterion  5.611153 
Sum squared resid  2786.629      Schwarz criterion  5.646904 
Log likelihood  -497.3926      Hannan-Quinn criter.  5.625651 
F-statistic  2.317506      Durbin-Watson stat  0.687784 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.129720       
         
           
 
 
 
 
 
 